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Robert R. Locke 
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM COST ACCOUNTING INTO 
BRITISH ENTREPRENEURIAL PERFORMANCE 
CIRCA 1914 
Abstract: This article takes issue with economic historians who have tried to re-
habilitate the reputation of the late Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur. It ar-
gues that the revisionist attempt to ground their case on cost, profit, and produc-
tivity calculations flounders because of an insufficient analysis of the factors 
involved in arriving at cost, profit, and productivity. The economic historian, 
preoccupied with recent European economic development could, therefore, improve 
his analysis by incorporating the science of management accounting into his 
methodology. A companion piece to this article will be published in the fall issue 
of the journal. 
Few if any problems in British economic history have drawn more 
attention than that of British economic performance during the late 
Victorian and Edwardian eras. Optimists have argued that the British 
economy functioned well, pessimists that it faltered badly, and the 
pessimists have usually had the upper hand in the debate. Recently 
a group of younger historians, led by Donald N. McCloskey, has de-
cidedly challenged the pessimists' view. "There i s . . . , " McCloskey 
wrote, " little left of the dismal picture of British failure painted by 
historians. The alternative is a picture of an economy not stagnating 
but growing as rapidly as permitted by the growth of its resources 
and the effective exploitation of available technology."1 Revisionists 
do not claim that the British economy expanded as rapidly as the 
American or the German; indeed some, unlike McCloskey, might 
even concede a relative economic stagnation. But they do not con-
cede that the British entrepreneur can be faulted. Economic facts 
limited his parameter of action but within that parameter he perform-
ed well. 
This article rejects the optimists' interpretation of British entrepre-
neurial performance. It is, however, less concerned with conclusions 
than with how conclusions have been reached, for much of the 
revisionism stems directly from the application of a "new" meth-
odology, grounded in economic theory and quantification.2 The 
contention is, therefore, that inadequacies in the optimists' conclu-
1
Locke: New insights from cost accounting into British entrepreneurial pe
Published by eGrove, 1979
18 The Accounting Historians Journal, Spring, 1979 
sions arise, to a considerable extent, from shortcomings in historical 
method. Ideas taken from cost accounting will be used in this two 
part essay to establish the validity of the contention. 
The first part deals with epistemological problems raised by revi-
sionist econometrics. Macroeconomics is the wellspring of the revi-
sionism, but macroeconomics is not the only science that is con-
cerned with economic activity. Carl Menger pointed this out in the 
19th century when he described . . the separation of the sciences 
into historical and theoretical. History and the statistics of econ-
omy are historical sciences . . economics is a theoretical science." 
But he added that there is 
still a third [science], the nature of which is essentially 
different from that of the two previously named; we mean 
the so-called practical sciences or technologies. The sci-
ences of this type do not make us aware of phenomena, 
either from the historical point of view or from the theoret-
ical; they do not teach us what is. Their problem is rather 
to determine the basic principles by which, according to 
the diversity of conditions, efforts of a definite kind can be 
most suitably pursued. They teach us what the conditions 
are supposed to be for definite human aims to be achieved.3 
The "third science" is important because it has developed over the 
past hundred years into business administration, a field in which the 
cost accounting technology that is now called management account-
ing finds its place. Cost accounting is an entrepreneurial technology 
par excellence. As a bookkeeping system which deals primarily 
with the accurate reporting of internal financial information, it is of 
interest not only to businessmen but to historians trying to evaluate 
entrepreneurial performance. Unfortunately, historians have not used 
the sciences of business administration in general and cost account-
ing in particular to facilitate their analysis of recent European 
economic development.4 This is somewhat surprising considering 
the extent to which business schools have grown in American col-
leges and universities over the past eighty years. A significant 
methodological tool is at hand but because historians have ignored 
it even the new economic history has suffered scientifically, as this 
brief study of its use of data on costs, profits, and productivity will 
show. 
The second part of the paper (to be published in the fall issue) 
will demonstrate how the development of cost accounting theory 
and practice can itself be considered an index of entrepreneurial 
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prowess in an economy. There is, of course, no necessary corre-
lation between entrepreneurial excellence and a developed cost 
accounting technology. Sydney Pollard, in The Genesis of Modern 
Management, has stated, for example, that "[T]he practice of using 
accounts as direct aids to management was not one of the achieve-
ments of the British industrial revolution.. ."5 Yet if throughout most 
of the 19th century profit margins were large enough, in Britain at 
least, for businessmen to be rather negligent about cost factors, 
with the keen industrial competition of the "great depression" (after 
1873) cost consciousness heightened and cost accounting flour-
ished.6 First only prime costs, i.e., direct labor and raw materials 
costs drew the owners' and hence the bookkeepers' attention; but, 
as industry grew in organizational complexity and in plant sophisti-
cation and size, a third cost classification, burden (or overhead) 
occupied people's minds. Accounts for indirect labor costs (includ-
ing the cost of management itself), for installation charges (lights, 
power, etc.), and for an ever more diversified inventory, which the 
new market economy required, were created. Capital equipment 
replacement, whose costs became progressively higher, had to be 
provided for in depreciation accounts that integrated depreciation 
allowances into the cost structure of manufactured products. After 
1880, then, an elaborate manufacturing cost accounting system 
arose. After 1900 sales and distribution accounts were added in 
order to determine marketings' share of total product cost. And 
finally, after 1910, historical costs gave way to standard costing and 
budgeting as management strived to create accounting tools suitable 
for measuring costs, profits, and productivity in an increasingly 
complex industrial world. The institutionalization, during the Second 
Industrial Revolution, of entrepreneurial performance in the form of 
good accounting procedure became, therefore, in itself a factor in 
the creation of industrial efficiency. Indeed, a leading accounting 
historian, A. C. Littleton, has remarked, "It is not too much to say that 
the formulation of cost accounting procedures can be ranked as an 
achievement second only to the original development of bookkeeping 
according to double-entry principles..." in management technol-
ogy.7 
Although economic historians realized long ago that bookkeeping 
played an important role in modern European economic develop-
ment, they have not, like some accounting historians, devoted much 
attention to cost accounting.8 A survey of major periodicals shows, 
for example, that neither The Journal of Economic History nor 
Explorations in Economic History has ever published an article on 
3
Locke: New insights from cost accounting into British entrepreneurial pe
Published by eGrove, 1979
20 The Accounting Historians Journal, Spring, 1979 
cost accounting; that The Economic History Review, aside from a 
recent article on "Josiah Wedgewood and Cost Accounting in the 
Industrial Revolution," only printed one other article on bookkeep-
ing (not cost accounting); and that even the Business History Review 
has neglected the subject.9 Only the article on the Dupont de 
Nemours Powder Co., 1903-1914, really deals with the contribution 
of a cost accounting system to a firm's success, and this firm, of 
course, was American.10 Since cost accounting became a "neces-
sary" technology in European as well as American industry after 
1880, the second section of the paper will show how the institu-
tionalization of this management technology did not speak well for 
British entrepreneurship. 
First, however, a critique of revisionist quantitative work must be 
done. In "From Damnation to Redemption: Judgments on the late 
Victorian Entrepreneur," Donald N. McCloskey and Lars G. Sand-
berg state that they and others (including Roderick Floud, Charles 
Harley, Peter Lindert, and Keith Trace) have utilized a variety of 
analytical techniques to refute the hypothesis of British entrepre-
neurial failure." Nonetheless, the authors continue 
this gives a misleading impression of heterogenity of pur-
pose in the new work. The various measures used are es-
sentially identical. Higher profits can be achieved if more 
output can be produced with the same input, that is, if pro-
ductivity can be raised. The measuring rod for entrepre-
neurial failure, then, can be expressed indifferently as the 
money amount of profit foregone, as the proportion by 
which foreign exceeded British productivity, as the distance 
between foreign and British production functions, or as the 
difference in cost between foreign and British techniques. 
All of these give the same result and each can be translated 
exactly into any one of the other.12 
Nothing about this statement would be methodologically foreign to 
a cost accountant. Although profits do depend on the market, un-
doubtedly they can be increased if "more output can be produced 
with the same input," e.g., if the prime costs (material and direct 
labor) and overhead costs can be reduced in the manufacture of a 
particular product the profits will be greater. Moreover the factors 
involved in the calculation of inputs and outputs employed in a pro-
ductivity index are the same as those used in the calculation of pro-
duction costs and profits. Still, the idea that a productivity figure, a 
profit statement, or a cost statistic can be used as a "measuring 
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rod" for entrepreneurial performance is not necessarily true. Pro-
ductivity, cost, and profit are not factors in themselves but the result 
of economic activities that combine a multitude of factors. In some 
cases the factors which are involved in the calculation of cost, profit, 
or productivity reveal superior, in other cases poor, entrepreneurial 
performance even though the actual costs, profit, or productivity 
figures are the same. Entrepreneurial performance can be evalu-
ated, as the science of cost accounting shows, only after the factors 
involved in the calculation of productivity, cost, or profit have been 
isolated and assessed. 
Thus, since the revisionist historians work with productivity, cost, 
and profit figures, the validity of their statements about entrepre-
neurial performance depends on their analysis of the factors that go 
into the compilation of productivity, cost, or profit statistics. And in 
this respect their work is deficient. Three examples of insufficient 
factor analysis, picked at random from a collection of studies, will 
be used to substantiate this charge. The first is Donald N. McClos-
key's study of productivity in the iron and steel industries of Britain 
and America before World War I . " The second is Charles Harley's 
analysis of the change from sail to steam power in the British mer-
chant marine.14 And the third is Roderick Floud's work on the ma-
chine tool firm Greenwood & Batley, 1856 to 1900.15 The three 
studies are quite different in method and content but all suffer from 
inadequate factor presentation. 
McCloskey, in his well-known quest to save the reputation of 
British entrepreneurs, claims that productivity in the British and the 
American steel industries was approximately the same before World 
War I (in fact Britain might have had a slight edge). This proves, he 
contends, that America had no technological advantage in this in-
dustry and, hence, that American entrepreneurial performance was 
not superior to British in this industry. Since pig iron was the most 
significant cost item in steel production he sought to prove his case 
by concentrating the analysis on comparative pig iron production.16 
McCloskey assumed that the marginal product of the pig iron used 
in the production of steel rails can be determined by dividing the 
price of pig iron by the price of steel rails. From this calculation he 
determined that the marginal product of pig iron used in British and 
American steel rails did not vary significantly and that the produc-
tivity levels (average market price of pig iron divided by average 
market price of steel rails) were comparable.17 It is not McCloskey's 
productivity calculations but the technological conclusion he draws 
from them which is at stake here. These conclusions are question-
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able because relative factor costs in pig iron production must be 
considered when relative technological performance is evaluated. 
Some of these factors could represent obsolescent, others progres-
sive technology and the factor mix could be so different in the two 
countries that a technological gap could exist between their steel in-
dustries despite a temporary productivity parity. 
Because McCloskey's article does not provide data for this factor 
analysis, Sydney Pollard's study of British shipyards in 1904 will be 
used to illustrate this contention.18 Pollard observed that, since pro-
ductivity per man in British shipyards was 12.5 tons as compared to 
6.8 tons in the United States and 3.3 tons in Germany, Britain had 
an overwhelming productivity lead. He goes on to remark, however, 
There is little doubt that much of the equipment found in 
British yards was less advanced than that in America and 
Germany. British yards had their ancient steam engines to 
generate power, their lathes and plate-bending machines, 
but, as far as the installation of hydraulic, pneumatic, or 
electric power transmission was concerned, or the use of 
mechanical yard transport . . ., even electrical lights, most 
of them were years behind their chief foreign rivals, and 
visiting foreign experts could seldom conceal their aston-
ishment at this backwardness.19 
Obviously, in this industry, superior British productivity had nothing 
to do with technological advantages. Pollard's explanation: Britain's 
lead in fact is not technological. British shippers, who had long 
dominated world trade, ordered ships at such a rate that British 
shipbuilders, unlike their foreign competitors, could specialize in 
production, thereby enjoying economies of scale.20 Because of the 
early start, moreover, British yards had been able to train an abun-
dant supply of excellent artisans, boilermakers, shipwrights, and 
managers to build the ships. British shipyards acquired productivity 
advantages, then, because Britain's early commercial supremacy 
gave them a market and a trained labor force that their rivals did 
not have. 
Pollard's article shows why good productivity should not automati-
cally be equated with good technology. Better British productivity 
in 1904 probably resulted from the last positive effects of an old 
technology than from the first fruits of a new. As Pollard, referring 
to Britain's competitors, put it, 
In the absence of a pool of skilled labor, foreign shipbuild-
ers were obliged to install expensive equipment much of 
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which could not pay unless and until all processes had be-
come much more mechanized and shipbuilding had be-
come a true mass-production industry.21 
Unless British entrepreneurs modernized their yards they would, 
when shipbuilding became a mass production industry in the 20th 
century, lose their productivity edge. Indeed the advantages of 1904 
later would obstruct technological progress, for artisanal labor 
would fight to keep the old system rather than be replaced by the 
semiskilled machine operators typical of mass production industry. 
At the moment British shipbuilding held this productivity lead, then, 
the industry was already obsolescent. 
The technological capabilities of the British, German, or American 
shipbuilding, iron and steel, or any other industry cannot be divined 
from productivity figures unless the factors which determined total 
costs have been scrutinized. Economic historians cannot assume 
that the cost factors were the same in two industries. It could have 
been, for example, that in one country industry had invested heavily 
in new plant and equipment while in another it had not. If that were 
the case then one overhead cost (depreciation) could be very high 
in one and very low in another industry. This could mean that the 
capitalists had kept prices low and profits high through shortsighted 
investment policy. Any intelligent cost accountant would know that 
these entrepreneurs were engaging in business folly, even though 
the stockholders might be taken in by the good dividends, and the 
economic historians by the low prices. Whether this happened in 
either the British or American pig iron industry is not known. Mc-
Closkey's view that productivity rates correlated with technological 
performance, therefore, could be right or it could be wrong. The fact 
that American iron and steel productivity subsequently outstrips 
British, as McCloskey himself acknowledges, suggests that he is 
wrong, for superior American technology, which accounts for this 
subsequent productivity gap, might have existed earlier. But, since 
no factor analysis was done, there is no way of knowing from the 
data presented in this essay whether its postulates are true. 
The basic assumption in Harley's article is the following: as the 
steam engine became progressively more efficient coal consumption 
was reduced to a point where the cost of running steamships equal-
ized and then fell below that of running sailing ships. He concluded, 
therefore, that a technological factor, engine efficiency, determined 
when a shipping line shifted from sail to steam. Harley did not prove 
his case directly by studying fuel consumption costs. Rather he 
found out which lines converted to steam on which voyages, and 
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when. His discovery that the time of conversion depended on the 
length of voyage (i.e., steam was first used on short hauls, then in-
troduced on longer hauls) supported a technological explanation for 
the shift, i.e., storage space for the bulky engine fuel prohibited prof-
itable longer voyages until more efficient engines reduced fuel con-
sumption. 
McCloskey and Sandberg claim that Harley . . reconstructed the 
production and cost functions for sailing and steamship, through 
which he was able to examine the speed with which entrepreneurs 
replaced one with the other as their relative profitability changed."22 
This is an extraordinary assertion. Cost accounting affirms that la-
bor, material, and overhead are the principal cost divisions. To have 
done what McCloskey and Sandberg claim, Harley would have had 
to look at costs in all three categories for both sailing ships and 
steamships. He clearly did no such thing. He isolated one cost fac-
tor only, fuel, and assumed, since the time of conversion correlated 
with length of voyage, that engine efficiency determined the pace of 
change. But one major cost factor cannot be decisive unless it is 
considered with other major cost factors. It is possible, if improb-
able, either that sailing ship labor costs increased steadily and con-
siderably, or that coal fuel costs fell drastically over a long period, 
thereby shifting the cost advantage away from sail to steam. The 
speculation is, moreover, potentially important. If rising labor costs 
on sailing ships were responsible for the conversion to steam, it 
could no longer be directly attributed to a technological factor. 
Harley's work is to be praised for its originality but it certainly falls 
short of the methodological thoroughness that has been claimed. 
Roderick Floud used Greenwood & Batley's cost accounts to de-
termine the firm's long-term productivity record (1856-1900). He 
concluded that ". . . Greenwood & Batley were achieving consider-
able increased productivity" during the period.23 The question is 
whether Floud's productivity index is reliable. He preferred to use 
the capital invested in equipment manufacturing machine tools as 
one element in his index but was forced, because of the firm's poor 
bookkeeping, to abandon the idea. Instead he made the metal 
weight of the machines producing machine tools the input and the 
metal weight of the machine tools produced the output. If the 
amount of metal contained in the machine tools produced by a ma-
chine tool increased in relation to the weight of the producing ma-
chine, productivity improved. The index depends, therefore, on a 
very important assumption; namely, that the producing machine tool 
did not vary in weight during the period. If it did then the constant 
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with which he sought to measure productivity (increase of metal in 
machine produced in relation to the weight of producing machine) 
would become unstable and the productivity index would collapse. 
Floud realized the importance of his assumption.24 But he did not 
give much evidence to prove that it was justified. He simply referred 
to some contemporary observations and moved on. Econometrics 
seeks to replace the subjectivity of argument-by-example from con-
temporary literary sources with the objective exactitude of statistical 
compilation. It seems inadequate, therefore, to produce a lot of sta-
tistical evidence to prove that one factor important to a calculation 
is true (i.e., that machine tools produced more weight in the ma-
chines manufactured) but none to show the validity of a second (that 
the weight of the producing machine tools remained unchanged). 
Furthermore, the connection between entrepreneurial capacity 
and technological progress, which was Floud's ultimate concern, 
was examined inadequately. The period covered brought the tran-
sition from iron to steel construction; metal strengths greatly in-
creased in relation to weights. It is hard to believe that this revolu-
tion in metallurgy did not affect the weight of producing machine 
tools but if it did not that fact must be explained. Floud hinted at 
the importance of the metallurgical question. He noted that, with the 
introduction of high speed steel, the machine tools had to be com-
pletely redesigned. But he added that these changes happened after 
1900. This means, then, that Floud really studied this company dur-
ing a period of technologically stagnation in the design and manu-
facture of machine tools. Greenwood and Batley cannot receive 
kudos for entrepreneurial prowess, despite a favorable productivity 
record, when world technology was dormant. A more useful ques-
tion might be: how did Greenwood & Batley respond when the use of 
high-speed steels induced technological movement in machine tool 
design and manufacture? Floud does not answer this question. He 
stated only: "Such steels were introduced in the United States in the 
1890s, but there was a delay in their introduction in Britain."25 
One only has to read the minutes of the discussions which fol-
lowed the papers printed in the volume from which these examples 
have been taken to realize the great extent to which the work suffers 
from methodological insufficiencies. Cost accounting theory empha-
sizes the complexity of profit, cost, and productivity determination, 
especially when such factors as depreciation and inflation have to 
be considered. Cost accounting practice shows the risky nature of 
generalizations about technological performance from productivity 
indices, particularly when the factor evidence is contradictory. Cost 
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accounting history reveals that uniform accounting practices were 
not followed before 1914, which raises doubts about the reliability 
of the statistics used in econometric studies. With such evidence no 
capable cost accountant could talk very confidently to his boss 
about a firm's comparative profit, cost, and productivity achieve-
ments. And economic historians, faced with conclusions about the 
good performance of British entrepreneurs, should be circumspect 
when these conclusions are based on incomplete data, collated 
some seventy years after events, which are subject to very different 
interpretations. At least the historians should be skeptical when 
these conclusions run counter to those of experienced contemporary 
management engineers and cost accountants who found British en-
trepreneurial and technological performance markedly deficient. 
FOOTNOTES 
1McCloskey, Did, p. 459. 
2The strength of the optimists' case rests, by their own insistence, on the super-
iority of a methodology. McCloskey notes, for example, that "The route by which 
this and other conclusions . . . were reached is perhaps even more significant for 
British economic historiography in the long run than the conclusions themselves." 
McCloskey, Essays, p. 7. Indeed, for McCloskey the cliometric rescue of the British 
entrepreneur has become an indisputable historical truth. See, McCloskey, The 
Achievements, p. 23. 
3Menger, p. 38. 
4Although two influential business historians, N. S. B. Gras and Henrietta Larson, 
defined business history as "primarily the study of the administration of business 
units in the past" neither they nor the business history community used the analyti-
cal tools being developed in schools of business administration. Certainly they 
have ignored cost accounting. 
5Pollard, Genesis, p. 288. 
6An editorial on "Practical Prime Costs" in Engineering (1891) said that up to 
twenty years before "selling prices could generally be fixed at figures leaving good 
margins, and a 'rough and ready' cost of a certain article or piece work, upon 
which generally could be fixed a fancy profit, with a liberal contingency allowance, 
was as a rule found all that was required. . . . It is during the past 15 or 20 years 
that prime costing has been developed to the elaborate systems in operation in 
many of our large and well-managed firms." Solomons, p. 19. 
7 Littleton, p. 359. 
8This point has also been made by H. Thomas Johnson in The Role, p. 444. 
9McKendrick, pp. 45-67. 
10Johnson, Management, pp. 184-204. 
11McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 103. 
12McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 103. 
13McCloskey, International, pp. 285-309. 
14Harley, pp. 215-37. 
15Floud, pp. 313-44. 
16See also McCloskey, Productivity Change, pp. 281-96. Although, in this work, 
McCloskey establishes a productivity index on the basis of relative factor mix in 
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British pig iron production he does not do the same for the American industry. 
Thus there is no basis for comparing the relative factor mix in both countries. He 
states that the mix between coke, iron ore, labor, and capital, remained constant 
in the British industry throughout the period. He also says that British productivity 
did not grow during the period. What was the factor mix in America? Did it also 
remain constant? The questions are important because America did achieve pro-
ductivity gains between 1885 and 1913. 
17Calculations are given in McCloskey, International, pp. 297-98. 
18Pollard, British, pp. 426-44. 
19Pollard, British, p. 437. 
20Pollard writes, "Of the superiority in skill, labour and management at that 
time, based on tradition and on an efficient system of apprenticeship, contempo-
raries had little doubt. American wages were higher than British by a third at 
least, a difference that more than outweighed any possible higher productivity 
gained by mechanical equipment (while overheads were, of course, much higher)." 
Pollard, British, p. 437. 
21Pollard, British, p. 437. 
22McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 103. 
23Floud, p. 336. 
24Floud, p. 322. 
25Floud, p. 343. 
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